I Introduction
This chapter analyses the relationship between the changing nature of the expertise underlying and legitimising EU response to public health emergencies, and executive power.
In general, in case of the spread of a highly contagious virus on a pandemic scale or when an emergency threatens the health and life of a population, the counter measures that are approved and coordinated by the executive in charge, build on the advice of epidemiological experts, who will inform the policy makers on the speed of the spread, the likelihood that vaccines will work, or on what other public health measures may need to be taken, such as school closures or extra capacity in hospitals. Many of these experts are public health experts, epidemiologists, with a public health, or medical degree. The EU's involvement in planning for public health emergencies, such as a communicable disease outbreak has focused on the coordination and harmonisation of Member States emergency plans, ensuring the least impact on the internal market. The efforts of the EU address e.g, planning, coordination of an emergency response, assessment, prevention and communication.
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In this chapter the Health Threats Decision of 2013, 3 is analysed as signifying a shift in the EU public health response model, towards a 'preparedness model' blending the underlying expertise that is used for EU health emergency response from the above-described public health experts towards security experts (economists, critical infrastructure and defence experts). The chapter also shows that this shift is the result of a transforming expert understanding of the nature of the health risks that we are facing. It describes a regulatory In recent years the EU has become increasingly involved in the coordination and response to a number of major health events such as Zika, Ebola, bird flu, SARS, swine flu and the EColi outbreak. 5 In 2013, the EU adopted a new legal instrument, the Decision on Serious
Cross-Border Threats to Health ('Health Threats Decision'), 6 to regulate its involvement in the response to public health threats, chemical attacks and bioterrorism. This Decision, adopted by the Council and the European Parliament is an all-encompassing regulatory instrument, covering not only known, but also unknown health risks. It is a European effort to, in the words of the European Commission, 'bridge the policy fields of health and security'.
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The main purpose for this Decision is to regulate the coordination of Member States action in responding to 'major health threats' by encompassing the already existing communicable disease control network and a number of health threats that before where mainly addressed, if at all, in the context of security policy. 8 These other health threats include biochemical attacks and bio-terrorism, and hazards created as a result of climate change. 9 Moreover, the coordinating structures created by the Health Threats Decision:
[S]hould, in exceptional circumstances, be available to the Member States and to the 
II Reconfiguring Public health: Globalisation and Security
How is the changing understanding of public health risks that underlies the Health Threats Decision co-producing EU executive power? With regard to the underlying expert rationale for understanding public health risks, there are two highly interrelated frames of analysis applied at national and global levels that create a pathway for analysing the co-production of executive and expert power in the field of public health in the EU. The first frame relates to a reconfiguration of understanding public health risks. The second frame relates to globalisation and 'securitisation'.
A Reconfiguring Public Health Risks: From Risk Management to Crisis Preparedness
At a global level there has been an observance of a 'reconfiguration of biomedical and security expertise'. 13 This reconfiguration leads to new 'forms of expertise and the practices of intervention through which disease threats are understood and managed'. 14 One explanation for this reconfiguration is that the second part of the twentieth century has given rise, in the words of Sheila Jasanoff: 'to risks that escape the framework of actuarial 10 ibid. At paragraph 9. In the famous account of Ulrich Beck, technical innovation and modernisation processes have created risks of which we can no longer foresee the possible future harm:
'Along with the growing capacity of technical options grows the incalculability of their consequences'. 16 Technological advances have produced new risks to human health, and expertise itself, is also the main source for debate on the nature of these risks and on whether the values involved are adequately addressed in its regulation. 17 As a result, the authority of the expert and scientific understanding of these risks itself becomes a political question. 18 This new understanding and scholarly debate on risks and their nature both by experts and policymakers has had specific implications for different types of disaster management in the recent decades. 19 This is particularly true for the field of public health as a science and policy field, when it concerns the response to a major health emergency.
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Public health as we now understand it in general terms, developed in the nineteenth century as a way of managing and understanding infectious diseases. 21 Prior, communicable disease epidemics were largely seen as exogenous, unpredictable or as 'Acts of God'.
However, in the nineteenth century the social conditions of populations, for instance with respect to sanitation, living conditions and circulation became predicaments that could be statistically analysed and managed through public policies and inoculation strategies. Within modernity's public health rationale, cost-benefit analysis could be used to legitimise an eradication campaign of polio and small-pox. 22 After the Second World War, experts, particularly also biodefense experts, started recognising and hypothesising the possible limitations of a public health approach to infectious diseases and to gauge the possibility of outbreaks as extraordinary events, without historical precedent.
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In recent decades, alongside a changing understanding of public health risks as a result of technological advances as described by Beck, the rationale and understanding of the risk of pathogens -that have been around in various forms for centuries -also changed and resulted in a new public policy consensus; from public health containment strategies to a 'preparedness approach' to infectious disease. 24 The underlying idea is that increasing scientific knowledge on communicable diseases has created new threats to public health, for instance in the form of a possibly accidental or deliberate release of dangerous diseases.
Prime examples here are the anthrax scare after 9/11 and the recent bird flu virus developed at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the controversy surrounding publication on its modification in potentially human-contagious forms. This new context of 'preparedness for the unknown and the deliberate rather than the accidental', applied to consider disease, reconfigures experts' understanding in the determination of public health risks. 25 The difference between the 'public health frame' and the 'preparedness frame' in public policy terms is that a preparedness strategy does not use statistical forecasts based on past events.
Rather, it uses scenario sketches and simulation models in order to prepare for uncertain future events. The second, interrelated development that has led to a changed expert framing and understanding of public health risks is a move from 'public health policy' to 'health security policy'. The conceptualisation of 'health security or biosecurity', rather than 'public health' refers to a layering and integration of perceived security threats to human health and general public health concerns. 'Biosecurity' or 'health security' then is used as a term to recast the effort of public authority in relation to the protection of the health of the population. This move to security is relevant as it signifies a shift in governance discourse.
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Biosecurity as Gostin and Fidler use it in the global context describes 'society's collective responsibility to safeguard the populations from dangers presented by pathogenic microbes'. 28 However, the term also refers to efforts to protect populations against harm caused by biological weapons and biological terrorism and chemical attacks. The public policy rationale behind combining the public health and security strands of policy has been argued to result from the nature of the policy and the institutional actors that (should) be involved in harnessing these types of threats:
The emergence of biosecurity reveals that the days when public health and security never intersected as governance tasks have ended. … The policy silo's of security and public health are not integrated as they should be in order to respond to the threats that we face today. Globalisation, beyond terrorism, is also a factor in the recasting of public health as a security issue. The global circulation of people and goods has also increased the concern for 27 Arjen Boin and others, The threats presented by biological weapons and natural disease epidemics weave together to form an independent policy challenge the likes of which we have never seen before.
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Globalisation however also entails a recasting of what 'security' means. Historically security was usually used to describe 'state security', ie, the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from harm caused by another state. However, recently there has been a move to the use of the term security in the broader sense of 'human security'. 38 In the words of Anne- allows the Commission to determine that there is a public health emergency (Article 12) and take subsequent 'immediate implementing measures', which allow the Commission to adopt temporary measures outside of the use of a comitology Committee. 54 Keeping in mind that the structures established by the Decision may also be used in 'exceptional circumstance, not covered by the Decision' these legal provisions potentially create significant executive power for public health at the EU level.
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In order to draw an initial institutional map, the following table shows the principal institutional actors that come into play in a health emergency response at the EU level. 53 Other treaty provisions that form the basis for related mechanisms on disaster prevention can be found in the context of civil protection (TFEU, art 196), the solidarity clause (TFEU, art 222), EU financial assistance to Member States (TFEU, art 122), and humanitarian aid to third countries (TFEU, art 214 Expertise and particularly also public health experts have been part and parcel of the existence of the modern democracies. 56 Experts have a long-standing and significant role in contributing to the legitimacy and acceptability of the EU's involvement in risk regulation. 57 With the growth of the EU's involvement in a variety of policy matters, the need for expertise in these areas grew as well. 58 In the European Union, cooperation in the area of public health was from the very beginning a logical consequence of increased trade and integration. 59 Although with respect to veterinary disease, such as bovine tuberculosis the Community had already formulated some policy, 60 with respect to human communicable disease control the Union's involvement started in the 1970s.
The first involvement of the Union took place in an exchange of letters on communicable disease monitoring with the WHO in 1972. 61 Over the course of the 1970s
European surveillance networks were set up for a number of communicable diseases, such as HIV/Aids, tuberculosis, legionella and influenza. 62 This eventually led to a European public health research programme that was launched in 1984 on the serious spread and threat of HIV/Aids. 63 In 1994 the surveillance networks became the subject of a public health network headed by the national communicable disease surveillance centres to create a unified framework for the surveillance of communicable diseases and training for epidemiological intervention (EPIET) under the auspices of the European Commission. 64 The initial Network was a bottom-up initiative on the basis of the advice of a Charter group of the heads of public health institutions with responsibility for communicable disease in the Member States. 65 However, already since the start of the 1990s epidemiologists across the EU worked together in a network to tackle particular communicable diseases together, primarily for the sake of epidemiological data sharing and exchange. 66 Under the auspices of the Network Committee, the surveillance of single diseases was consolidated and the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) was set up. 68 The
Committee was in charge of determining the case definitions for communicable diseases, data and methods for surveillance and issue guidelines on the countermeasures to be taken in times of emergencies. 69 In the EWRS, similarly to the surveillance network, the exchange of information for the operation of this system was legally limited to information on new or unknown communicable diseases or to the list of diseases covered under the annex of Decision 2119/98/EC.
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The Charter group as it was first conceived was a bottom-up network of experts in the field of communicable disease control as a public health matter. However, after the BSE crisis in the 1990s and with the increased perception of EU interdependence for responding to 'health crises', in 2004 the EU's work on communicable diseases was further consolidated with the establishment of the ECDC. 71 Important in this respect is that the locus of expertise on communicable disease control that was in the network setting a matter of national experts, was given a European counterpart. Particularly in the EU administrative space this was an important development given that the advice of the ECDC could now legitimise more farreaching action of the executive actors involved in responding to a public health threat at the EU level, given that the input of science into the policy making at the EU level provided increased autonomy for the executive. In terms of the reconfiguration of public health risks the 1998 Communicable Diseases Decision to 'formalise' the existing networks of national networks of epidemiologists and public health executives into a single European institutional actor was an important stepping stone for decoupling the different national approaches and cultures to communicable diseases and creating one European 'best practice'. At the same time the EU involvement remained limited to communicable diseases, particularly to a predetermined list of diseases. Thus, although the reconfiguration of public health expertise in the direction of surveillance and preparedness for communicable disease outbreaks as security threats had also reached the EU level, to a large extent the focus was still on the list of known diseases that formed the backbone of these public policy efforts. This changed rather swiftly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
B Securitisation of EU Public Health Risks
The 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the subsequent Anthrax attack played an important role in the securitisation of EU public health. Communicable disease control generally in the EU had little political traction. 77 Scott Greer in this respect noted that:
Politically, communicable disease control policy is caught in the logic of crisis and collective action: outside of crises, it is hard to find energy for collective action, whereas in crises, countries can sometimes overcome the barriers to collective measures and take actions.
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In response to the 9/11 attacks the Council immediately created a 'Health Security Committee' (HSC) which was an a informal group of high level ministerial and health department representatives, principally conceived as being able to bind its Member States as a matter of intergovernmental, diplomatic executive action rather than EU action. States on the basis of WHO guidelines and with the health of the ECDC. 89 When the first news came that there was a swine flu outbreak in Mexico, the EU immediately became highly involved in response planning, particularly also given that a 'fast track' procedure for the authorisation of pandemic vaccines by the European Medicines Agency had to be activated, and without the declaration of an 'Emergency of International Concern' by the WHO, the fast track procedure could not be activated according to the EU regulations on medicines. 90 Over the course of the unfolding of the swine flu pandemic, the HSC and the Network Committee, both acting under the auspice of the European Commission' Health Threats Unit, were increasingly working together when decisions were made by the HSC that formally fell under the responsibility of the Network Committee, and where the HSC basically had no formal powers. 91 Thus, as an institutional matter the public health experts and security experts were merged and the public health powers available at the EU level were used to formalise security measures that without the context of the Network Committee would be 'mere' diplomatic agreements.
The EU's response to the swine flu outbreak represents the first time a public health emergency of pandemic scale was coordinated at the EU level. Member States were highly vulnerable due to the availability of vaccines being dependent on the EU central authorisation procedures and with respect to the information available to the public, given the plethora of open access online sources. 92 As a result, this health emergency opened a 'window of opportunity' for more far-reaching legislation at the EU level. After an elaborate 'evaluation'
IV Conclusion
The reconfiguration of expertise in the area of public health befitting a security framework and the co-production the EU executive changes with respect to the response to a health creates a vast potential for the EU executive to engage in the response to anything that may be framed as a 'health threat'. 94 Communicable disease control and prevention have been long-standing champions of the welfare state. The public health experts that came together in the 1990s at the EU level to exchange ideas and strategies in order to cope with these public health challenges as a network of experts, have now been overtaken by a new rationality. And this rationality of public health preparedness, threats and security put the power of expertise and knowledge about risks in the hands of 'health security' specialists. And this paradigm creates a new route for the EU to affect the welfare systems: vaccination schemes are no longer a way for national governments to protect its population form disease, but are reconfigured as a security instrument. 95 In other words, the shift from public health expertise to security expertise also shifts the attention towards critical infrastructures, which entails a much broader 'security view' that also keeps in mind business continuity, competitiveness and other threats to security rather than the public health view that is mainly focused on the life and health of the population. 96 Furthermore, the focus on security in the field of public health also shifts away the attention and resources from the public health problems that produce far greater morbidity and mortality, and can only be solved by socio-political interventions that focus on pervasive and on-going health problems rather than focusing on unlikely, extreme and rare events.
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The Health Threats Decision in this regard creates a stronger base for the EU executive to coordinate and respond to public health events in comparison to previously available powers.
However, beyond the growing role of the EU executive in the field of public health as coproduced by a newly-blended landscape of public health-security expertise and experts, the public health policies of the Member States are also affected by the growing role of the EU level of the expert-executive in this respect. 98 The role of the EU in this respect may affect the lives of individual Europeans significantly. 
